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Customer Disservice
BANK COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW YORK STATE
EXEMPT INCOME PROTECTION ACT
INTRODUCTION

We live in "[olne of the worst economic downturns of
modern history." Many Americans are mired in debt.' And if
they stop paying their debts, creditors often take them to
court.3 Most debtors do not mount a defense.4 Many do not even
know they have been sued.5 Frequently, the creditor wins a
money judgment against the debtor in court.6 Judgment in
hand, the creditor turns to the debtor's bank and informs it
that the money in the debtor's account belongs to the creditor.7
The bank, in turn, freezes the account.' One day, the debtor
goes to make a purchase with his bank card, and his card is
rejected.9 The debtor is now unable to pay for food, rent,
transportation, or other necessities. ° "People go hungry. They
get sick or sicker. They suffer anxiety."". The consequences can
be "devastating." 2
Until a couple of years ago, most of this was perfectly
legal in the State of New York. Not surprisingly, people started
complaining. 3 In response to these complaints, New York
I

John Collins Rudolph, Pay GarnishmentsRise as Debtors Fall Behind, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010.
2

See infra Part I.B.

3

See infra Part I.E.
See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.

4

r See infra Part I.E.
6

See infra Part I.E.
I.D.

7 See infra Part

" See infra Part I.D.

9 Rudolph, supra note 1.
'0 See Frozen Out: A Review of Bank Treatment of Social Security Benefits,
Hearing before the S. Fin. Comm. 2 (2007) (statement of Margot Saunders, Counsel,

National Consumer Law Center).
11 Id.
12

See id.

13 Johnson M. Tyler, Exempt Income ProtectionAct Better Protects Strapped

Debtors, 241 N.Y.L.J. 4 (Jan. 27, 2009); see also Catherine M. Callery & Louise M.
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lawmakers passed the Exempt Income Protection Act
("EIPA), 4 an amendment to the New York Civil Practice Law
("CPLR"). As a result of this new legal protection, when a
bank receives notice of a money judgment from a creditor, the
bank must withhold a certain amount of money-either
$1,740"6 or $2,500-in the account."
In theory, EIPA prevents creditors from seizing every
last penny from a debtor's bank account, thus allowing the
debtor to meet basic food, housing, and medical needs while
seeking release from the account restraint. EIPA is designed to
provide relief to indebted individuals who live paycheck to
paycheck and who depend upon modest incomes for their
sustenance."8 The statute has been praised by consumer
advocate groups as a great step forward in consumer protection
law." But in the short time since EIPA's enactment, legal
services groups have received numerous complaints that banks
are not complying with the law." This Note argues that banks
fail to comply with EIPA because they have little incentive to
do so-in fact, they profit by violating the law-and
recommends that the statute be amended to better induce bank
compliance so that the law may function as intended.
Part I of this Note explores the conditions that led to the
passage of EIPA, including the rise of consumer debt, the
increase in the use of electronic banking, the expansion of
Tarantino, Bank Freeze Problems Attract Attention, May 1, 2007, http://www.
empirejustice.org/issue-areas/disability-benefits/ssi-ssd/income-resources/bank-freezeproblems-attract.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). The problems with restraints have
also been documented by the courts. See generally Lincoln Fin. Servs., v. Miceli, 851
N.Y.S.2d 58 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2007); Contact Res. Servs., LLC v. Gregory, 806 N.Y.S.2d
407 (N.Y. City Ct. 2005).
14 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws 575
(McKinney).
15 South Brooklyn Legal Services, SBLS Helps Draft New EIPA Law, Jul. 10,
(last
2008, http://www.sbls.org/index.php?pg=2&s=spotlight&c=SSIDisability-Rights
visited Nov. 1, 2009). The law was passed on June 24, 2008. Id.
" When EIPA went into effect, the law protected all bank accounts without
statutorily exempt payments up to $1,716, set to be increased incrementally based on
the Consumer Price Index. In July, 2009 the amount increased to $1,740. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5222(i), 5205(l)(3)(ii).
17 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(l) (2009).
18 NEW YORKERS FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, EXEMPT INCOME
PROTECTION
ACT MODEL BILL SUMMARY 2, 5-6 (2009), http://www.nedap.org/programs/documents/
EIPA-billsummary.pdf [hereinafter NYRL SUMMARY].
" See Press Release, Neighborhood Economic Development Advocacy Project,
NEDAP Praises Legislature for Passing Bill to Prevent Abusive Debt Collection (Jun. 26,
2008), availableat httpJ/www.nedap.orgpressroom/EIPAPressStatement6-26-08.html.
20 Kirsten E. Keefe & Gina Calabrese, Exempt Income Protection Act Update,
Aug. 13, 2009, httpJ/www.empirejustice.org/issue-areasconsumer-community-develop
ment/fair-debt-collection/exempt-income-protection-act.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
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consumer credit litigation, and the statutory shortcomings of
the CPLR. Part II examines EIPA's intended effect and
describes its procedural structure in detail. Part III surveys the
available remedies against banks for EIPA violations under
both federal and state law, arguing that these options are
insufficient. Part III also appraises several model exempt
income statutes, including existing state statutes similar to
EIPA,and concludes that each lacks appropriate incentives to
compel bank compliance. Lastly, Part IV suggests that an
amendment to EIPA include a provision that provides
individuals who prove injury due to banks' violation of EIPA
with a remedy to recover actual damages, punitive damages,
costs, and attorney's fees, similar to section 362(k) of the
United States Bankruptcy Code.
I.

BACKGROUND

Before EIPA, both New York and federal law prohibited
creditors from using the legal system to satisfy debts with
certain subsistence funds.' For example, the federal Social
Security Act protects Social Security, Social Security Disability,
Supplemental Security Income, and Veterans' benefits from
"execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal
process.'2 Likewise, New York law shields all statutorily
exempt funds such as Social Security, Supplemental Security
Income, Public Assistance, Workers' Compensation, and
Unemployment Insurance from garnishment.' In addition,
New York law protects from seizure a set amount of wages
equal to thirty hours per week of employment at minimum

21

Those funds include government benefits and ninety per cent of earned

income from the past sixty days. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (2000), amended by N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5222 (2009); see also 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006); NYRL SUMMARY, supra note
18, at 2.
2
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006). The statute provides:
The right of any person to any future payment under this title shall not be
transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid
or payable or rights existing under this title shall be subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of
any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
Id.

.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(l). Other protected benefits include public or private
pensions, retirement, survivors' and disability benefits, child support payments,
Veterans Administration benefits, railroad retirement, and black lung benefits. Id.
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wage, 4 and up to ninety percent of any individual's income
earned within the last sixty days.2'
Prior to EIPA, a weakness in CPLR section 5222
allowed creditors to game the system and use a judgmentwhether obtained by default or on the merits-to freeze bank
accounts, regardless of their protected contents.26 While some
state laws require a judgment creditor to first obtain a court
order prior to seizing a bank account,27 CPLR section 5222
authorized a judgment creditor's attorney to send a restraining
notice directly to the judgment debtor's bank without first
obtaining a court order.' Under CPLR section 5222, the
judgment debtor's bank must freeze the account or risk being
held in contempt of court, without exception for accounts
containing easily identifiable exempt income.' This defect in
the CPLR resulted in harm to low-income New Yorkers whose
bank accounts were restrained despite their exempt status, and
often without prior notice of a lawsuit or judgment."
In the absence of EIPA, individuals had no effective
recourse under the CPLR to assert claims that their restrained
funds were exempt from collection under either federal or state
law.2 In response to an account restraint, judgment debtors
could either: (1) contact the judgment creditor's attorney to
request a voluntary release of the restraint, or (2) file an order
to show cause in civil court requesting that a judge lift the
restraint. 2 The former procedure left the judgment debtor at
the will of the creditor's attorney, who could refuse to lift the
restraint or who could lift the restraint on the condition that
the judgment debtor enter a payment plan." The latter
procedure could take "weeks if not longer" before the court

24

Id. at 5231(b).

25

Id. at 5205(d).

26 NYRL SUMMARY, supra note 18, at 2, 4.
27 Allen C. Myers, Untangling the Safety Net: Protecting Federal Benefits

from Freezes, Fees, and Garnishment, 66 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 390 n.108 (2009).
28 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a).
29 Id.
at 5222(b).
30 NYRL SUMMARY, supra note 18, at 2-3.
31 Robert A. Martin, Written Comments of the Committee on Consumer
Affairs Association of the Bar of the City of New York on Debt Collection Practices 1
(2006) http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/CommentsDebtCollectionPracticesNYCBar.pdf
(last visited Apr. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Martin, Written Comments].
32 Id. at
2.
33 Johnson M. Tyler, Exempt Income ProtectionAct
Better Protects Strapped
Debtors, 241 N.Y.L.J. 4, 7 (Jan. 27, 2009).
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order went into effect.' For the majority of indebted individuals
who cannot afford to hire an attorney, both options were
extremely difficult. 5 While the debtor struggled through these
difficult and time-consuming procedures, the debtor's bank
often charged late fees, as well as overdraft fees if the
judgment exceeded available funds. 6
Aside from the loophole in the CPLR, various factors
have contributed to the problem of judgment creditors freezing
bank accounts that contain exempt funds. These factors,
identified by consumer attorney Johnson Tyler, include: (1) a
decrease in credit card regulation, (2) a rise in consumer debt,
(3) an increase in the use of electronic banking and direct
deposit by recipients of exempt funds, (4) a provision in the
CPLR that allows debt collectors to easily cross-reference their
records with those of banks, and (5) an increase in the use of
litigation by creditors to recuperate consumer debt. 7
A.

Decrease in Credit Card Regulation

Since the 1970s, regulators and courts have relaxed the
laws governing fees and interest charged by creditors.38
Historically, national banks were subject to individual state
anti-usury statutes that capped interest rates. But in 1996, the
United States Supreme Court held in Smiley v. Citibank9 that
under the National Bank Act of 1864, late fees qualify as
"interest."4 ' As a result of the decision, national banks can

charge credit card holders under the usury statute of the state
where

the

bank

is

located.4 '1 This

unanimous

decision

incentivized credit card companies to incorporate in states with
weak usury laws, to offer credit cards to individuals with a low
likelihood of paying on time, and to rake in penalty fees. 2 Not

Legal Services NYC, Governor Paterson Signs Exempt Income Protection
Act, http://www.legalservicesnyc.orgindex.php?option=content&task=view&id=178; see
also Martin, Written Comments, supra note 31, at [2].
35 Martin, Written Comments, supra note
31, at [2].
386 Legal Services NYC, supra note 34.
37 Tyler, supra note
33, at 7.
a8 THE URBAN JUSTICE CTR., DEBT WEIGHT: THE CONSUMER CREDIT CRISIS

IN NEW YORK CITY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORKING POOR 3 (2007), http://www.
urbanjustice.orgtpdf/publications/CDPDebtWeight.pdf [hereinafter DEBT WEIGHT].
39 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
40 Id.
at 737.
41 Id.
42 Tyler, supra note 33,
at 7.
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surprisingly, Smiley also resulted in an increase in consumer
debt among low income individuals.'
B.

Rise in Consumer Debt

Empirical studies demonstrate that our nation has
recently seen an "explosive rise in consumer debt."" A 2006
study by the Center for American Progress revealed that "[flor
the first time on record, families have outstanding debt that is
greater than their incomes." 4' For example, from 1989 to 2004,
the average amount of credit card debt owed by a typical family
rose 62.9 percent to $2,150 per household.' In that same
period, the proportion of families with credit card payments
above ten percent of their income nearly doubled, from 13.5
percent to twenty-three percent.'7 Another study by the Center
for Responsible Lending ("CRL") revealed that in 2005, the
mean amount of credit card debt for households with annual
incomes of less than $35,000 was $6,504 per household.' As of
2009, Americans owe over $900 billion in credit card debtV and
since 1995, the personal savings rate in the United States has
been below five percent.'
For low- and middle-income families, credit card debt
has risen the most." Importantly, these families are using
consumer credit to pay for basic necessities at an everincreasing rate."2 In the 2005 CRL study, seven out of ten lowand middle-income families reported a reliance on credit cards

43

Id.

TAMARA DRAUT ET AL., DEMOS & CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE
PLASTIC SAFETY NET: THE REALITY BEHIND DEBT IN AMERICA 4-5 (2005), http'J/www.

demos.org/pubs/PSN-low.pdf [hereinafter PLASTIC SAFETY NET].
45 CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, PUSHING
THE LIMIT:

CREDIT CARD DEBT BURDENS AMERICAN FAMILIES
1 (2006), http/www.
americanprogress.org/kf/creditcarddebtreport-pdf.pdf [hereinafter PUSHING THE LIMIT].
41 Id. at 1.
47

Id.

48

PLASTIC SAFETY NET, supra note 44, at 8.

49 Federal Reserve Statistical Release, FRB: G.19 Release-Consumer Credit

(March 4, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/Current/.
50 See MARSHALL B. REINSDORF, ALTERNATIVE

MEASURES OF PERSONAL

SAVING 7, 13 (2007) http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2007/O2%2OFebruary/O207-saving.
pdf; see also Bureau of Economic Analysis, Overview of the Economy, Table (Sept. 16,
2009), available at www.bea.gov/newsreleasesxlsglance.xls.
51 PUSHING THE LIMIT, supra note 45, at 1.
52

PLASTIC SAFETY NET, supra note 44, at 10.
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to pay for basic necessities such as housing, food, medicine, and
transportation.'
C.

Increase in the Use of Electronic Banking

A 2007 study by the Federal Reserve shows that
consumers increasingly manage their finances through
electronic technology.' Between 2003 and 2006, "the number of
debit card payments . . . increased from 15.6 billion to 25.3
billion."" While low- and moderate-income households are
overall less likely than higher-income households to have a
bank account and use electronic banking services, the use of ebanking technologies by low- and moderate-income households
has been growing at a significant rate.' For example, between
1999 and 2006, low-income consumers reported a tenfold
increase in online banking, from three percent to thirty
percent." Furthermore, while older consumers are less likely
than younger consumers to use ATMs, debit cards, and online
banking, the use of direct deposit had generally increased with
age.
Over a decade ago, the federal government began a
campaign to encourage individuals who receive federal benefits
payments to have those funds directly deposited because it
would save the government the cost of printing, mailing, and
processing benefit checks." In 1998, the federal government
enacted regulations requiring that payment of Social Security,
Veterans, and other benefits be made by electronic funds
transfer.' Consequently, as of March 2010, 86.9 percent of
beneficiaries receive federal benefits by direct deposit."

53

id.

CATHERINE J. BELL ET AL., FED. RESERVE, U.S. HOUSEHOLDS' ACCESS TO
AND USE OF ELECTRONIC BANKING, 1989-2007 A99 (2009), http://www.federalreserve.

gov/pubs/bulletinl2009/pdf/OnlineBanking09.pdf [hereinafter ELECTRONIC BANKING].
55

Id.

56 Id. at A107.
57

Id.

58 Id. at A108.

59 Daniel M. Gold, Balances Without Checks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/ (search "Daniel Gold Balances Without Checks";
then follow "All Results Since 1851" hyperlink).
' See 31 U.S.C. § 3332(a)(1) (2006). The Act contains an opt-out provision. Id.
§ 3332(c).
61 Social Security Administration Beneficiaries, Social Security DirectDeposit
and Check Statistics (March 2010), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/deposit/GIS/data/
Reports/T2StateSum.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
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While the increase in the use of electronic banking
means that people can better keep track of their finances,
ensure timely bill payment and receipt of government benefits,
and avoid hefty check-cashing fees, 2 it also means that directly
deposited benefits are at risk because they sit in a bank
account where they are vulnerable to creditor garnishment.'
D.

CPLR Sections 5222(g) and 5224(a)(4) Allow Creditors
Easy Access to Bank Records

CPLR sections 5222(g) and 5224(a)(4) give New York
debt collectors powerful discovery tools to locate and freeze a
bank account." As noted earlier, under CPLR section 5222(a), a
creditor that seeks to enforce a money judgment can serve a
restraining notice directly on the judgment debtor's bank."
Upon receiving the restraining notice, the bank is required to
freeze the debtor's funds up to twice the amount of the
judgment.' Pursuant to CPLR sections 5222(g) and 5224(a), a
debt collector may electronically search judgment debtor names
and Social Security numbers through bank databases"7 and, if a
match is found, instantaneously freeze the account. 8
Consequently, these provisions provide debt collectors immense
power to swiftly collect on their claims once they have obtained
a judgment in civil court.
E.

Rise in Consumer Credit Litigation

Recently, there has been a sharp increase in the number
of consumer debt lawsuits filed in New York City Civil Court.69
Between 2001 and 2006, consumer credit litigation increased in
ELECTRONIc BANKING, supra note 54, at A99; see also Tyler, supra note 33, at 7.
See infra Part I.D.
Tyler, supra note 33, at 7. Debt collectors can "computer match the names
and Social Security numbers of judgment debtors against bank records." Id. at 7. Once
a judgment is obtained, the debt collector can "run[] tens of thousands of judgment
debtor names through bank databases looking for matches. When an account is
matched, the debt-collection firm freezes it." Id.
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(g), 5224(a)(4) (2009). The creditor's attorney can
then sign the restraining notice as an "officer of the court." Id. 5222(a).
Id. 5222(b). The freeze remains in effect until the judgment is satisfied or
vacated, or a sheriff seizes the debtor's property. Id. The bank is required to comply
with the provisions of the restraining notice; disobedience is punishable by contempt of
court. Id. 5222(a), (b).
67 See supra note
64.
6 Id.
6

69

DEBT WEIGHT, supra note 38, at 1.
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the five boroughs by nearly 300 percent.0 In 2006,
approximately 320,000 consumer debt lawsuits were filed in
New York City, totaling almost $1 billion in claims against
New York City residents." The number of consumer debt cases
filed in 2006 in New York City alone "is comparable to the total
number of civil and criminal cases filed in the federal trial
courts nationwide [during] that [same] year." 2
Almost all consumer credit lawsuits are filed by thirdparty debt buyers who purchase defaulted debts in bulk for
pennies on the dollar. 3 The third-party debt buyers then
engage in aggressive and harassing tactics, including repeated
phone calls and letters, to collect on the outstanding debt. 4 If
these tactics fail, debt collectors frequently turn to the courts to
recover on their claims." This course of action is often a
profitable one. A 2006 study by the Urban Justice Center
reported that, of the $1 billion worth of consumer credit
lawsuits filed against New York City residents, debt collectors
obtained judgments in the amount of almost $800 million."
Eighty percent of these cases were decided not on the merits of
the case, but by default.7 Moreover, only 6.7 percent of New
York City defendant debtors appeared in court when required
to do So. 7 ' Frequently, the debtor did not know about the
lawsuit until his bank account was frozen. 9
70

See id. at 8.

71

Id. at 1.

id.
See id. at 3. "In 89.3% of the cases . . . reviewed, debt collection litigation
was initiated not by the original creditor but by a third-party debt buyer who had
purchased the debt in question." Id. at 13.
74 See id. at 3; see also Sewell Chan, An Outcry
Rises as Debt Collectors Play
Rough, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com2006/07/05/
nyregionl05credit.html?_r= 1&pagewanted=2.
75 DEBT WEIGHT, supra note 38, at
9.
76 Id.
77 Id. A default judgment results when the defendant
fails to appear in court
and mount a defense. Id. The study found that
72
13

[iun 99.0% of the cases where default judgments were entered, the materials
underlying those applications constituted inadmissible hearsay and did not
meet the standard set forth in section 3215(f) of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules for the entry of a default judgment. Nevertheless, these applications
were approved; the default judgments were entered; and New York
consumers suffered the consequences.
Id. at 9, 11.
78 Id. at 9.
79 Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney
General Cuomo

Sues to Throw Out over 100,000 Faulty Judgments Entered Against New York
Consumers in Next State of Debt Collection Investigation (Jul. 23, 2009), available at
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The shockingly low defendant debtor appearance rate
raises the question of whether those defendants received
proper notice of their pending lawsuit. Indeed, on July 23,
2009, New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo sued
thirty-five New York State law firms and two debt collectors for
failure to serve defendants with the legally required notice that
they were being sued.' The Attorney General is seeking to
recover the proceeds of an estimated 100,000 default
judgments.8 Significantly, the lawsuit alleges that the debt
collectors systematically engaged in "sewer service" by failing
to notify defendants of a lawsuit and falsifying sworn affidavits
of service.' The combination of all of these factors led to the
passage of EIPA.

II.

EIPA'S INTENDED EFFECT

A.

EIPA's ProceduralStructure

The procedure by which judgment creditors, judgment
debtors, and banks determine when and how to restrain bank
accounts under EIPA is slightly complex. The statute sets out a
multiple-step process for the debtor account-holder to claim as
exempt certain amounts exceeding the minimum threshold,
and for creditors to object to the debtor's exemption claim.
Arguably, the simplest part of the process is the bank's early
duty to spare a set amount of money from restraint. If a bank
fails to comply with that crucial initial step, the remaining
procedural steps are not triggered. By failing to comply with
EIPA, the bank denies both the creditor and the debtor-the
bank's own customer-the opportunity to litigate over the
remaining funds.
Under EIPA, when a creditor obtains a judgment in
consumer credit litigation, the creditor sends a restraining
notice, with exemption claim forms, to the judgment debtor's
bank.' If the account contains identifiable exempt funds
deposited within the last forty-five days, $2,500 of the account
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media center/2009/july/july23b_09.html
Release, Office of the Attorney General].

[hereinafter Press

8' Id.; see also Jonathan D. Glater, N.Y. Claims Collectors of Debt Used

Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com2009/07/23/

business/23cuomo.html.
81 See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, supra note 79.
82 See id.
' N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b) (2009).
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remains available to the judgment debtor.' If the account does
not contain identifiable exempt funds, only $1,740 of the
account remains free from restraint.' However, if the account
contains less than the respective threshold amounts (i.e., less
than $2,500 in a beneficiary's account and less than $1,740 in
any other account) the restraint is deemed void." Consequently,
if the account contains more than the respective threshold, the
of those amounts "subject
bank restrains any balance in excess
87
to marshal's or sheriffs execution."

When the account contains more than the threshold
amount, the bank takes the exemption claim form (initially
sent by the judgment creditor) and forwards it to the judgment
debtor.' If the debtor does not return the form to the bank, the
excess funds remain restrained and subject to levy." However,
if the debtor completes and returns the form to the bank and
the creditor within 20 days, the creditor may respond in several
ways. First, the creditor can do nothing; but after eight days,
the bank must release the account in full if the creditor fails to
take further action.'
If the debtor provides proof that all or part of the funds
are exempt, the creditor must instruct the bank to release the
Id. 5205(l)(1).
Id. 5222(i). At the time of writing, this amount ($1,740) equals the greater
of 240 times the federal minimum wage or 240 times the state minimum wage; it is set
to increase in tandem with the increase in the federal and state minimum wages. Id.
5232(e). However, the federal and state minimum wages do not rise in tandem. "Where
an employee is subject to both state and federal minimum wage laws, the employee is
entitled to the greater of the two wages." U.S. Dept of Labor, Wages-Minimum Wage,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/minimumwage.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
8
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(h)(1), (i).
"7 GINA CALABRESE, THE EMPIRE JUSTICE CTR, NYS EXEMPT INCOME
PROTECTION ACT FLOW CHART (2009), http:/Iwww.empirejustice.orgassets/pdf/issue[hereinafter CALABRESE,
areas/consumer-community-development/eipa-flow-chart.pdf
FLOW CHART]. It should be noted that on May 4, 2009 New York lawmakers signed into
law an amendment to EIPA in response to concerns regarding restraints issued by a
municipality and restraints for child or spousal support. See Kirsten E. Keefe & Gina
2009,
13,
Update, Aug.
Protection Act
Exempt
Income
Calabrese,
http://www.empirejustice.org/issue-areas/consumer-community-development/fair-debtcollectionlexempt-income-protection-act.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009) [hereinafter,
Keefe & Calabrese, Update]. The amendment provides that the provisions of EIPA do
not apply when "the state of New York, or any of its agencies or municipal corporations
is the judgment creditor, or if the debt enforced is for child support, spousal support,
maintenance or alimony," and requires that the restraining notice contain a legend at
the top stating the same. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(k).
"
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(3). A debtor can claim as exempt Social Security,
Social Security Disability, Supplemental Security Income, Public Assistance, etc. For a
full list of exempt income, see id. 5222-a.
89 Id. 5222-a(c)(1).
90 Id. 5222-a(c)(3).
"

"
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exempt portion within seven days.91 However, should the debtor
provide such proof that all or part of the funds is exempt, the
creditor need not concede. Indeed, the creditor may object to
the exemption, but it must do so in good faith and within eight
days of receiving the exemption claim.2 If a creditor objects, the
process moves quickly. A judicial hearing on the objection must
occur seven days after the objection, and a decision must be
rendered within five days of the hearing. 3 If the court grants
the objection, the creditor must serve the court order on the
bank within two days of the decision." If the bank does not
receive a court order within twenty-one days of the creditor's
objection, the bank must release the account.95 The quick pace
of this process underscores the urgency of resolving EIPA
disputes in a timely fashion, so that the judgment debtor has
access to much-needed exempt funds that are rightfully his.
B.

Bank Compliance with EIPA

Since EIPA became effective, legal services offices have
received complaints regarding banks' failures to comply with
the statute's provisions. For example, the Empire Justice
Center, a New York public interest law firm, reports that
"[iindividuals have reported that their accounts were
restrained even though the account contained less than the
threshold amounts . . 96 Likewise, United States Senator
Kirsten Gillibrand of New York has acknowledged that banks
and debt collectors ignore EIPA because there is insufficient
enforcement."
While no empirical study has been conducted regarding
the number of illegal post-EIPA freezes and their effect on
debtors, pre-EIPA case law illustrates the type of damages
individuals face when their bank accounts are frozen. Thus,
91 Id. 5222-a(c)(4).
92

Id. 5222-a(d), (g).

93 Id. 5222-a(d).
94

Id.

95 Id. 5222-a(e); see also CALABRESE, FLOW CHART, supra note 87.
EIPA also

provides that a judgment creditor may not serve more than two restraining notices per
year on an individual's bank account. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(c). EIPA further provides that
a bank may not charge the account holder a processing fee in the event that the
account contains below the threshold amount and as a result the bank is unable to
restrain the account. Id. 5222(j).
Keefe & Calabrese, Update, supra note 87.
97 Jonathan D. Epstein, Gillibrand Seeks to Protect the Elderly,
BUFFALO
NEWS, Sept. 16, 2009, at B7.
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one should assume that violations of EIPA result in similar
harms, such as service fees and garnishments.9 8
In Mayers v. New York Community Bancorp, Inc.,' three
plaintiffs sued various financial institutions and political and
judicial representatives of the State of New York to challenge
the constitutionality of CPLR section 5222."9° The first plaintiff,
Denis Mayers, was dependent on the $698 per month he
received in Social Security Disability payments that were
directly deposited into his bank account.1 ' In 2001, a creditor
obtained a judgment against Mr. Mayers for $1,594.15, and
thereafter restrained the funds in his account."2 As a result, the
bank dishonored four checks written by Mr. Mayers and
charged him $100 in bank fees. 3 Subsequently, Mr. Mayers
closed his old account, switched banks, and opened a new one."
Soon after, the same creditor issued a second restraint on Mr.
Mayers's new account.1 "5 Although Mr. Mayers did not incur
any fees as a result of the second restraint, he, like many
others, likely suffered emotional distress over the uncertainty
of whether he would be able to have money for basic
necessities." In 2003, after the creditor made a third attempt
to collect the judgment, Mr. Mayers's rent check bounced and
generated a $20 bank fee. 7 In addition, the bank returned Mr.
Mayers' Social Security check to the Social Security
Administration, which caused a delay in the receipt of his
much-needed benefits.0 8

98 The Social Security Administration has conducted studies regarding
instances of account restraints in violation of federal law which resulted in service fees
and garnishments from beneficiaries' direct deposit accounts. See generally OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUBL'N NO. A-15-08-28031, CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE REPORT: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DEDUCTING FEES AND GARNISHMENTS

FROM SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 1 (2008), http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-1508-28031.pdf. A financial institution generally charges $100 to $150 fees for the freeze
and $25 to $35 for each automated check transaction the account holder makes while
funds are unavailable due to the account freeze. Id. at 10.
Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. CV-03-5837, 2005 WL 2105810
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005).
10
See id. at *1.
101 Id. at *2. "The only other income he receive[d was] a $4.50 per
diem
stipend for volunteer work and $141 per month in food stamps." Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810 at *2.
'06
See Frozen Out, supra note 10, at 2.
19' Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810 at *3.
108 Id.
105
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At the time of the litigation, Nancy Ciccone, the second
plaintiff in Mayers, was a seventy year-old widow living with
her mentally disabled son."' She supported herself and her son
with $954 monthly Social Security payments and $715 monthly
Social Security Disability payments that were electronically
deposited into her bank account. " ° In 2000, a creditor obtained
a judgment against Ms. Ciccone for $2,006.63."' In 2002 and
again in 2003, the creditor, through an attorney, restrained Ms.
Ciccone's bank account."' As a result of the restraints, Ms.
Ciccone "bounced a number of checks, which generated a
banking fee of about $30" and incurred late payment penalties
on her credit cards of approximately $29 per card."' In addition,
"each restraint triggered a $100 banking fee.""" In total, the
two restraints "drained several hundred dollars from her
monthly income.""'
The third Mayers plaintiff, Elba Quinones, was fiftyeight years old and disabled at the time of litigation."6 When
the suit was brought, her only income consisted of $241 per
month in Social Security Disability payments and $430 per
month in Supplemental Security Income." In 1997, a hospital
obtained a judgment against Ms. Quinones in the amount of
$1,797.10."' In both 1997 and 2002, the hospital restrained Ms.
Quinones's account, but lifted the restraints after Ms.
Quinones informed the hospital that her account consisted only
of exempt funds."' But then, in 2004, the hospital, through its
attorney, restrained Ms. Quinones's account for a third time."'
Due to the restraint, Ms. Quinones was unable to withdraw her
benefits payments and "had to buy food on credit at the local
bodega.""' In addition, she incurred penalty fees of $29.99 for

Id.
Id.
III Id.
112 Id.
109
110

...Second Amended Complaint at
114 Id.

77, Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810.

"6 Id. The exact total amount drained from Ms. Ciccone's income is not stated
in the pleadings. Id.
116 Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810 at
*4.
117 Id.

Second Amended Complaint at 104, Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810.
...Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810 at *4.
120 Id.
11

"' Second Amended Complaint at

117, Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810.
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each late payment of three or four credit card bills, and1 a $10
late-payment penalty for failing to pay her rent on time.'
In Mayers, the three plaintiffs demonstrate that
individuals generally incur approximately $100 in fees as a
result of illegal account restraints. At the same time, these
individuals suffer through the unknown of whether the
restraint will be lifted and whether the next benefits payment
will be available." While $100 may appear inconsequential to
most-especially to the banks that service these clients-it is a
considerable burden to low-income individuals who do not have
consistent streams of income.
III.

LEGAL REMEDIES AGAINST BANKS ARE INADEQUATE

A.

Legal Remedies Against Banks Are Insufficient Under
EIPA

Banks fail to comply with EIPA because they have
incentives to disobey the law and because debtors' remedies
against them are insufficient. Banks have an incentive to
disobey the law because they generate legal and insufficient
2
fund fees when all the money in the account is restrained."
While these fees may only add up to less than $100 per
customer, restraints against multiple accounts may result in a
windfall to the bank. Consequently, the law must impose a
penalty for noncompliance, and New York courts need to
enforce this remedy. As it stands, EIPA provides no express
remedy to the debtor in the event that a financial institution
violates its provisions."' Furthermore, the law imposes few
requirements on banks compared to the explicit restrictions
against debt collectors."' Importantly, the only part of EIPA
that contemplates bank compliance is section 5222(j), which
provides that if a restraint is placed in violation of the CPLR, a
bank may not charge a fee.127 Similarly, section 5232(f) provides
Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810 at *4.
See Frozen Out, supra note 10, at 2.
12 See supra Part II.B.
'22
'2'

125

5232(e)-(g).
126

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(l)-(n); 5222(b)-(e), (h)-(j), 5222-a; 5230(a); 5231(b);
For example, judgment creditors are not allowed to serve on banks more

than two restraining notices per year. Id. 5222(c). If a court finds that a judgment
creditor objects to a claim exemption in bad faith, "the judgment debtor shall be
awarded costs, reasonable attorney fees, actual damages and an amount not to exceed
one thousand dollars." Id. 5222-a(g).
127
Section 5222(j) provides:
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that a bank may not charge a fee for its costs in processing a
levy by service of execution when the account only contains
exempt funds.128 However, the law does not afford a remedy to
the debtor if the financial institution charges fees in violation
of EIPA. By contrast, section 5222-a(g) affords a remedy to the
debtor in the event that a judgment creditor objects to the
debtor's exemption claim in bad faith."u
In the absence of a specific statutory remedy for debtors,
banks have little incentive to follow the law-especially when
the account contains less than twice the judgment amount. As
a consequence, banks have incentives to disregard the law,
restrain the account, drive the account balance into a negative
amount, and thus rake in overdraft fees.' In addition to the
opportunity to charge fees, banks have additional economic
incentives to ignore EIPA. By disregarding the law, banks
avoid the cost of implementing a system that would determine,
first, whether an account contains statutorily exempt funds
(i.e., whether the account should be exempt up to $2,500 or
$1,740), and second, whether the account qualifies as exempt
(i.e., whether the account contains more or less than the $2,500
or $1,740).' Significantly, the bank can shift some of the cost of
In the event that a banking institution served with a restraining notice
cannot lawfully restrain a judgment debtor's banking institution account, or a
restraint is placed on the judgment debtor's account in violation of any
section of this chapter, the banking institution shall charge no fee to the
judgment debtor regardless of any terms of agreement, or schedule of fees, or
other contract between the judgment debtor and the banking institution.
Id. 5222(j).
128

Section 5232(f) provides:

In the event that a banking institution cannot lawfully garnish or execute
upon on a judgment debtor's banking institution account or funds are
garnished or executed upon in violation of any section of this chapter, the
banking institution shall charge no fee to the judgment debtor regardless of
any terms of agreement, or schedule of fees, or other contract between the
judgment debtor and the banking institution.
Id. 5232(f).
129 Section 5222-a(g) provides:

Where the judgment creditor objects to a claim of exemption pursuant to
subdivision (d) of this section and the court finds that the judgment creditor
disputed the claim of exemption in bad faith, as provided in paragraph four of
subdivision (c) of this section, the judgment debtor shall be awarded costs,
reasonable attorney fees, actual damages and an amount not to exceed one
thousand dollars.
Id. 5222-a(g).
'30 See supra Part I.B.
'3' See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(1).

20101

CUSTOMER DISSERVICE

1551

non-compliance to the courts. When the account holder is
unable to access much-needed funds, he will rush to the courts
to file an order to show cause to vacate the default judgment.
B.

Legal Remedies Against Banks Are Insufficient Under
Federaland State Law

Although remedies for noncompliance under EIPA itself
are insufficient, a debtor may have a cause of action against a
bank under federal or state law. While there are indications
that New York courts are trending towards increased duties on
bank
for
remedies
current
institutions,
financial
noncompliance under both federal and state law are
insufficient.
Although the remedies available to judgment debtors
bringing actions against judgment creditors are plentiful,
debtors' remedies against banks are lacking. If creditors
wrongfully seize account funds or other exempt property,
debtors may bring common law claims of conversion,132
negligence,"n or malicious prosecution," as well as statutory
claims for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 3
and state deceptive practices statutes.' However, as the
following cases show, courts are reluctant to impose similar
liabilities on banks that participate in the seizure of exempt
funds pursuant to a writ of execution or other court order
served by the judgment creditor.
While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not
addressed the issue of bank liability for the restraint of exempt
funds, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue
M

132 See, e.g., Rahaman v. Weber, No. A04-882, 2005 WL 89413 (Minn. Ct. App.

Jan 18, 2005) (debtor stated a state tort claim of conversion against creditor for
wrongful seizure of her exempt bank account funds).
' 3 See, e.g., Pourny v. Maui Police Dep't, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1152-53 (D.
Haw. 2000) (debtor stated a negligence claim against creditor for "tak[ing] property...
not subject to levy [and] property exempt under [a] writ, such as his personal property
and tools of the trade").
1'4 See, e.g., Blankenship v. Staton, 348 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961)
(debtor properly asserted a malicious prosecution claim against a creditor for wrongful
attachment of property; but finding damages award excessive).
135 See, e.g., Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis, Co., L.P.A., 434 F.3d 432 (6th
Cir. 2006) (debtor brought a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act against
collection attorneys for filing false affidavits in support of action to garnish plaintiffs
bank account).
1W See Myers, supra note 27, at 371, 381.
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in Gorstein v. World Savings Bank. 7 In Gorstein, an individual
brought an action pro se alleging that his bank "wrongfully
deprived him of his Social Security benefits"'38 by failing to
"determine independently whether a portion of the funds in
[his] account were subject to statutory protections."13 The
Ninth Circuit found that the bank could not be held liable for
depriving a customer of his Social Security funds since the
bank had no duty to independently determine whether a
portion of the funds in the account holder's commingled
account was subject to statutory protections.'" Thus, the Ninth
Circuit refused to put the onus on the bank to determine
whether such funds had been deposited prior to effecting an
account freeze, despite the increase in the use of direct deposit
by Social Security recipients.''
In another opinion on the issue of bank responsibility,
Lopez v. Washington Mutual Bank, the Ninth Circuit examined
whether a bank may satisfy overdraft fees with protected
benefits." While Lopez was decided outside the context of a
court-ordered consumer credit judgment, Lopez is illustrative of
the Ninth Circuit's stance against bank liability for seizing
exempt funds. In Lopez, a group of individuals receiving
directly deposited exempt benefits challenged a bank's practice
of using the benefits to satisfy overdraft fees.'4 When the
individuals overdrew on their accounts, the bank satisfied the
deficiencies and overdraft fees with the exempt benefits.'" In
their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the bank's practice
of using statutorily exempt funds to set off overdrafts and
overdraft fees was prohibited by 42 U.S.C. §§ 407(a) and
1383(d)(1), provisions of the Social Security Act. 14' Likewise, the
complaint also alleged violations of California Civil Procedure
Code section 704.080, California's statutory equivalent to New
York's EIPA.1"
137 Gorstein v. World Savings Bank, No. 03-55292, 2004 WL 1923596 (9th
Cir.
Aug. 27, 2004).
18 Gorstein v. World Savings Bank, No. 01-56605, 2002 WL 31098439
(9th
Cir. Sept. 19, 2002) (granting Gorstein's motion to file a late reply brief).
"' Gorstein, 2004 WL 1923596 at *1.
1"0

Id.

141 See supra Part I.C.
'
'4

Lopez v. Washington Mut. Bank, 302 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).

Id. at 902.

'4

Id. at 903.

145

Id.

146

Id.
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In their suit, the plaintiffs claimed that the bank's
practices constituted a seizure of protected benefits by "other
legal process" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).1 7 The Ninth
Circuit held that the bank did not violate § 407(a) "because
there is simply no indication that the plaintiffs did not
voluntarily agree to apply their [Supplemental Security
Income] benefits in such a fashion."'" The court reasoned that
because the plaintiffs voluntarily opened accounts with the
bank, they engaged in "meaningful consent" when they
executed account agreements which notified them of the bank's
standard practices."9 According to the court, the plaintiffs
should have been aware that the account agreements allowed
the bank to apply their directly deposited funds to cure any
overdraft deficiencies and fees.15 Moreover, the court reasoned
that the plaintiffs voluntarily made arrangements to have their
benefits deposited into their accounts, and in so doing, they
were not forced to incur overdrafts. 5 '
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed the plaintiffs' state
law claims under California Civil Procedure Code section
704.080, which prohibits the use of exempt funds to cure
overdrafts and fees.' The court held that 12 C.F.R. section
557.11," a federal regulation that imposes requirements
governing checking accounts, funds availability, and service
charges and fees preempted section 704.080." As a result, the
Ninth Circuit avoided the application of California's equivalent
to EIPA. While Gorstein and Lopez are not binding in New
York, they are persuasive opinions that could potentially sway

147
'48
149

Id.
Lopez, 302 F.3d at 904.

Id.

"0 See id. at 904-05.
151 See id. at 904-5. In

a concurring opinion, Judge Noonan opined that were
the plaintiffs to prevail, banks would surely have "denied overdraft privileges" to
"Social Security recipients." Id. at 908 (Noonan, J., concurring).
152 See id. at 907 (majority opinion).
15 12 C.F.R. § 557.11 provides:

OTS hereby occupies the entire field of federal savings associations' depositrelated regulations. OTS intends to give federal savings associations
maximum flexibility to exercise deposit-related powers according to a uniform
federal scheme of regulation. Federal savings associations may exercise
deposit-related powers as authorized under federal law, including this part,
without regard to state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect
deposit activities, except to the extent provided in § 557.13.
15

Lopez, 302 F.3d at 907.
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future decisions by the Second Circuit on EIPA's effect on
banks.
Recent cases in New York suggest that courts may be
willing to impose additional duties on banks to determine
whether accounts contain only exempt funds. Although the
Second Circuit has not addressed this issue, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York ("Eastern
District") has held in two recent decisions... that recipients of
federal benefits may state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983156 claim against
banks that satisfy money judgments with federal benefits.
In Grangerv. Harris, the Eastern District found that a
federal benefits recipient has a valid § 1983 claim against
banks that knowingly disburse Social Security benefits to a
creditor.157 The court acknowledged that, while "no state official
was directly involved in the restraint of ...
[the] account, 1 8
nonetheless the plaintiff asserted a claim under the § 1983
"state compulsion" test: "the State 'has exercised coercive
power or had provided such significant encouragement, either

15

See Granger v. Harris, No. CV-05-3607(SJF)(ARL), 2007 WL 1213416

(E.D.N.Y. April 17, 2007); Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. CV-03-5837, 2005
WL 2105810 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005).
1H 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Thus, the plaintiffs in those two cases alleged
that, by satisfying money judgments with federal benefits, the banks had deprived
them of their constitutional rights under color of state law. Section 1983 provides, in
pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
Id.
"' Granger, 2007 WL 1213416, at *1-2. The court dismissed the plaintiffs
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. at *9. "The elements of a claim under [Section]
1985(3) are: '(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws ..
; (3) an act
in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is... deprived of any right of a
citizen of the United States." Id. at *9 n.10 (quoting Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221
F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2000)). The court also dismissed the plaintiffs claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act because the plaintiffs did not "allege that any of the
acts of which they complain were taken by reason of [plaintiffs] disability." Id. at *10
("In order to state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he or she had
a disability; (2) that he or she is otherwise qualified for the benefit that has been
denied; and (3) that he or she has been denied that benefit by reason of his or her
disability.") (citing Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 146-47 (2d Cir.
2002)).
158 Id. at *8.
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overt or covert,' that the action of the private entity must be
deemed that of the State."..
Likewise, in Mayers v. New York Community Bancorp,
Inc. the Eastern District found that a group of beneficiaries
stated valid § 1983 claims in an action against various banks
for restraining bank accounts that contained only directly
deposited benefits." In its holding, the court found that the
plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to show that the banks
"believed N.Y. CPLR [section] 5222(a) required them to
restrain accounts, irrespective of their contents, when served
with restraining notices.... In other words, the banks were
"compelled to freeze the accounts . . . or risk being . . . in
contempt of court." 2 Accordingly, the court found facts
sufficient to show that the state had "'exercised coercive power
or provided such significant encouragement, overt or covert,
that the choice in law must be deemed to be that of the
State."" 3
In addition, the Mayers court found that the plaintiffs
stated a claim under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' The court applied the well-known Mathews v.
Eldridge balancing test"' and assessed whether New York's
garnishment statute satisfied due process." In Mathews, the
United States Supreme Court established the due process
analysis to be applied when an individual alleges an unlawful
deprivation of property. Under the three-pronged approach, a
court must weigh: (1) the competing interests involved and how
state action affects those interests; (2) "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation" of property under current procedures and the
potential value of different procedures; and (3) the cost and

159
16o

Id. (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982)).
Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810, at *8-10. The court also found that the

plaintiffs stated facts sufficient to show that "New York's garnishment statute, [N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 5222,] as applied to bank accounts containing only electronically deposited
social security payments, violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution because it
conflicts with the [purpose] of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a)," of
.ensur[ing] that [benefits] recipients have the resources necessary to meet their most
basic needs." Id. at *15, *17.
161 Id.
at *10.
162 Id.
at *9.
(quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004).
163 Id.
14
'
166

Id. at *14.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810, at *11-13.
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administrative burden of implementing different procedures in
comparison to their potential value.'67
Through the Mathews analysis, the plaintiffs in Mayers
persuaded the court that the additional cost to the banks of
implementing procedural safeguards was negligible in relation
to the potential benefit of such implementation."a In agreeing
with the plaintiffs, the court noted that advances in technology
have made it easier for banks to determine whether accounts
contain only exempt funds." Likewise, the court reasoned that
a reduction in the number of erroneous account restraints
would, in turn, reduce the number of state court proceedings
where debtors seek to vacate the judgment to have the
restraint lifted.""
Given that technological advances have further eased
the process of determining the source of electronic deposits,
both Granger and Mayers promisingly suggest that courts will
impose additional duties on banks to determine whether their
accounts contain exempt funds. However, these decisions are
limited in scope. In both cases, the plaintiffs were able to show
that their accounts contained only directly deposited federal
benefits. Indeed, the opinions suggest that if the accounts
contained exempt funds commingled with non-exempt funds,
the banks would not be liable for the restraints. Furthermore,
these decisions do not protect individuals who fail to receive
statutorily exempt benefits but who are nonetheless lowincome. The New York State legislature, in enacting the
Exempt Income Protection Act, sought to protect all low-income
New Yorkers, regardless of exemption status. Therefore, when
banks do not comply with EIPA, individuals should be afforded
a remedy, irrespective of whether their accounts contain
exempt benefits, non-exempt funds, or some combination
thereof.

167

16
169
170

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810, at *13.
Id. at *13-14.
Id. at *14.
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Legal Remedies Against Banks Are Insufficient Under
ProposedModel Statutes and Existing Comparable
State Statutes
1. Model Statutes

The federal legislature and consumer advocates have
recommended model statutes comparable to EIPA in both effect
and purpose. However, none of the proposals incorporate
remedial provisions for bank noncompliance.
In 2008, United States Senators Herb Kohl and Claire
McCaskill introduced the Illegal Garnishment Prevention
Act,"' which would have required the Social Security
Administration to propose regulations to solve the problem of
exempt fund garnishment before the Social Security
Administration could advance its goal of promoting the direct
deposit of federal benefits.' Under the bill, the Department of
the Treasury, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 407, would have direct
authorization to issue regulations that protected Social
Security benefits.'' Thus, the bill, which has not passed,1 7 does
not directly provide for exempt income legislation.
The National Consumer Law Center ("NCLC"), a
nonprofit consumer advocacy organization, has proposed model
exempt income legislation to be enacted either at the federal or
state level. 7'The NCLC model statute provides for a "universal
exemption," or a "minimum [threshold] amount of dollars that
cannot be ... frozen in any bank account ...regardless of the
source of the funds in the account.' 7 As under EIPA, the NCLC
statute exempts the first $1,740 in any account, and the first
$2,500 in bank accounts into which statutorily exempt
payments have been directly deposited.7 7 The NCLC statute
further exempts the first $5,000 if the bank account is under
two or more names-one of whom is the judgment debtor-and
deposited
exempt payments
statutorily
both receive

171

Illegal Garnishment Prevention Act, S. 2850, 110th Cong. (2008).

172 See id.; see also Myers, supra note 27, at 408.
'3 S. 2850.
14 See Govtrack.us, S.2850: Illegal Garnishment Protection Act, http:/www.

govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl1O-2850 (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
...PROTECTING EXEMPT BENEFITS § 1 (Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.) (on file with
author).
176 Id. § 2(c).
11
Id. § 2(c)(i).
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electronically."8 The statute provides that a bank cannot charge
any fee for processing a garnishment order, regardless of the
terms of the contract between the account holder and the
bank.' Under the model law, creditors may be held liable for
costs, attorney's fees, and statutory damages of up to $1,000 for
bad faith violations of the statute." However, the NCLC model
statute fails to provide legal remedies in the event of bank
noncompliance.18 '
In his comprehensive and illuminating note, Untangling
the Safety Net: Protecting Federal Benefits from Freezes, Fees
and Garnishment, Allen C. Myers proposed draft legislation
designed to address the exempt fund garnishment problem. 8 '
Under Myers's approach, banks would be prohibited from
restraining the first $1,000 in an account containing statutorily
exempt funds directly deposited within ninety days of the
garnishment order." Myers also advocates that a bank should
not be held liable for "an erroneous good-faith assertion of [an]
exemption.""8 However, like similar proposed legislation,
Myers's proposal
lacks an express
remedy against
noncompliant banks.
2. Comparable State Statutes
While the vast majority of states do not provide
protection against account restraints, New York is not alone is
doing so. To be sure, most states require, at minimum, notice to
the judgment debtor of a garnishment and the opportunity for
a hearing to allow the debtor to assert that funds may be
exempt. " ' However, only four states-New York, California,
Connecticut, and Pennsylvania-have enacted laws that
require banks to exempt accounts from garnishment if the
"account contains reasonably identifiable exempt funds.""
However, only Connecticut's statute articulates a debtor's

178 Id. § 2(d)(ii).
179

Id. § 4(d).

18 Id. § 10(c).

18 Id. § 10().
81Id. § 10(d).
182 Myers, supra note 27, at 408-11.
18s Id. at 408.
184 Id. at 409.
18

Id. at 386.

188 Id. at 387.
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remedy in the event that a bank restrains exempt funds in
violation of the law."'
Enacted in 2007, the Pennsylvania law arguably
provides the most protection to beneficiaries of exempt funds.8
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3111.1 ("Rule 3111.1")
provides that any account containing exempt funds directly
deposited on a regularly recurring basis is completely exempt
from garnishment, regardless of whether the account contains
non-exempt funds." Rule 3111.1, similar to Myers's draft
legislation, immunizes banks from liability to creditors for
good faith errors in processing garnishment orders. 9' However,
Rule 3111.1 contains no provision specifying remedies to the
account holder should the bank restrain funds in violation of
the law. 9'
Whereas Pennsylvania law exempts from garnishment
all monies in accounts containing directly deposited benefits,
California and Connecticut (like New York) exempt certain
minimum threshold amounts from garnishment when the
account contains federally exempt funds. Under California
Civil Procedure Code section 704.080 ("Code section 704.080"),
the amount of exemption ranges from $1,225 to $3,650,
depending on the type of benefits received and the number of
account depositors. 3 While Code section 704.080 does not have
a threshold exemption for those who do not receive statutorily
exempt benefits, it shields from levy 75 percent of any debtor's
earned income in the account at the time the garnishment
order is served."4 While California debtors do not have to assert
an exemption claim to prevent banks from freezing their
account, Code section 704.080 contains no debtor remedy
provision in the event that the bank restrains funds in
violation of the law. As discussed previously, the Ninth Circuit
has also expressly decided that banks cannot be held liable for
violations of Code section 704.080.' 5
187 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-367b(n).

18 Myers, supra note 27, at 387.
"9 See PA. R.C.P. NO. 3111.1 (2009).
190 See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.

9' See PA. R.C.P. NO. 3146(b)(2) (2009).
search of LexisNexis, Westlaw and Google on or around
December, 2009 revealed no complaints that financial institutions have violated PA.
R.C.P. No. 3111.1.
193 See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 704.080(b) (West
2004).
'9
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 700.140(c), (e), 704.070(b)(2) (West 2004).
195 See supra notes 142-154 and accompanying text.
192 Author's
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Connecticut's General Statute 52-367b ("section 52367b") is like EIPA to the extent that it provides for a flat
exemption to all accounts containing exempt funds deposited
within thirty days of the bank receiving the garnishment
order. " However, the threshold amount of section 52-367b 1is
97
only $1,000, less than half of New York's $2,500 exemption.
Furthermore, section 52-367b does not have a threshold
exemption for accounts that do not contain Social Security or
other exempt benefits. In addition, Connecticut's law provides
that the bank may charge a fee of eight dollars to the judgment
creditor for the costs in complying with the law, a provision
that the other state laws lack. 9 '
As the only state that provides for bank liability for
failure to comply with the law, Connecticut's law stands alone
among the four states with exemplary exempt income statutes.
Connecticut General Statute section 52-367b(n) provides:
If such financial institution pays exempt moneys from the account of
the judgment debtor over to the serving officer contrary to the
provisions of this section, such financial institution shall be liable in
an action therefor to the judgment debtor for any exempt moneys so
paid and such financial institution shall refund or waive any charges
or fees by the financial institution, including, but not limited to,
dishonored check fees, overdraft fees or minimum balance service
charges and legal process fees, which were assessed as a result of
such payment of exempt moneys. Thereupon, the rights of the
financial institution shall be subrogated to the rights of the
judgment debtor.'"

The statute also provides for liability of the financial
institution to the judgment creditor for refusing to levy funds,'
so the financial institution also has a counter-incentive to turn
the funds over to the creditor. The law further immunizes
banks from liability to the creditor when making a "bona fide
error" in asserting exemptions on behalf of debtors."0 ' Moreover,
the statute does not purport to penalize a bank should the bank
merely restrain funds in violation of the law. It merely provides
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-367b(c).
See id. The law provides that if the account contains more than $1,000 in
exempt funds, the debtor may notify the bank and the creditor with an exemption
claim, asserting that the additional funds be exempt from collection. See id. § 52367b(e). The creditor may contest the exemption through a judicial hearing. See id.
§ 52-367b(f).
'6

197

19' See id. § 52-367b(m).

Id. § 52-367b(n).

"
2

Id.

201

Id. § 52-367b(o).
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a remedy if the bank goes so far as to pay money from the
account to satisfy the judgment." Therefore, while the statute
goes further than any other in putting banks' feet to the fire, it
falls far short of providing a strong incentive for bank
compliance.
IV.

TAKING GUIDANCE FROM THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

A.

Bankruptcy Code Section 362(k)

The automatic stay provisions under section 362 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code1 3 provide a useful corollary to
the Exempt Income Protection Act. Like EIPA, the automatic
stay gives the debtor a respite from collection actions. However,
unlike EIPA, section 362(k) provides for an individual debtor's
remedy should any entity violate its provisions. This Note
argues that the New York State legislature should amend the
CPLR to include a provision akin to the Bankruptcy Code's
section 362(k).
Section 362 is a procedural law that halts almost all
creditor action when a debtor files a bankruptcy petition.2 4 As a
temporary injunction, the automatic stay prohibits a creditor
from attempts to levy funds of the debtor"0 or the debtor's
bankruptcy estate.2 " Pursuant to section 362, a creditor cannot
initiate a lawsuit against the debtor,"7 cannot attempt to
enforce a judgment against the debtor,2 8 and must cease
enforcement activities that are already in progress.2 9 However,
the automatic stay may terminate upon the occurrence of
certain events, such as the dismissal of the bankruptcy case, or
upon request by a creditor to terminate the stay for cause.2 "
Notably, the automatic stay does not require notice or a
hearing to the creditor. Creditors are bound by the prohibitions
of the automatic stay regardless of their knowledge of the stay,
202 Author's search of LexisNexis, Westlaw and Google on or
around
December, 2009 revealed no complaints that financial institutions have violated CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-367b.
203 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
W4

Id.

205
2W

Id. § 362(a)(1)-(2), (6)-(7).
Id. § 362(a)(2)-(5).
Id. § 362(a)(1).
Id. § 362(a)(2).
Id. § 362(a)(4).
See Id. § 362(d).

207

2m
210
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but sanctions are imposed only against willful violations.211 If
an entity violates the automatic stay, section 362(k) governs
the debtor's remedies, stating:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an individual injured by any
willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover
actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
(2) If such violation is based on an action taken by an entity in the
good faith belief that subsection (h) applies to the debtor, the
recovery under paragraph (1) of this subsection against such entity
shall be limited to actual damages. 12'

In essence, section 362(k) provides that a debtor who can prove
injury due to a good faith violation of the automatic stay can
recover actual damages, whereas a debtor who can prove injury
due to a willful violation of the automatic stay can recover not
only actual damages, including costs and attorney's fees, but
also, potentially, punitive damages. Notably, section 362(k) is
vague in its application; it does not provide that only creditors
can be penalized for violations of the stay. Therefore, the
statute contemplates application against financial institutions.
Indeed, in its application of section 362(k), the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has
imposed liability against financial institutions for violations of
the automatic stay. As explained below, the decision In re
Adomah.'. illustrates how a New York court might enforce an
amended provision of EIPA modeled after section 362(k) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
B.

New York Courts' Treatment of Bankruptcy Code Section
362(k)

In In re Adomah, an individual Chapter 7 debtor, Syrria
Adomah, moved under section 362(k) "for an order imposing
damages against Bank of America for an alleged violation of
the automatic stay ... .""' Prior to Ms. Adomah filing her
bankruptcy petition, Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America
("Mitsubishi"), a creditor, entered a judgment against her in
the amount of approximately $8,927, and subsequently served
211 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).
212

Id.

213 340
214

B.R. 453 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 454.
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a restraining notice on Bank of America.2 ' Pursuant to CPLR
section 5222(b), the bank restrained Ms. Adomah's account "in
an amount equal to twice the judgment" amount. 1 ' Although
the funds in Ms. Adomah's account fluctuated after the
restraint, the account contained less than the judgment
amount at all times.2 " For example, at the time of the restraint,
Ms. Adomah's account contained approximately $5328 Nine
days later, Ms. Adomah directly deposited into her checking
account approximately $1,100, which became subject to the
2"
restraint.
Seventeen days after Mitsubishi served its restraining
notice, Ms. Adomah filed for bankruptcy.22 In her petition, Ms.
Adomah claimed her checking account funds as exempt from
creditors and attempted to free her account from restraint.21
She served a notice of the automatic stay on Bank of America
by mail, fax, and in person.22 In error, the bank advised Ms.
Adomah that only Mitsubishi's attorney could lift the restraint,
and required either: (1) a notarized statement by Mitsubishi's
attorney stating that Ms. Adomah had settled the debt or (2)
Mitsubishi's agreement to lift the account restraint."
In the three weeks following the filing of her bankruptcy
petition, Ms. Adomah was unable to pay her rent on time as a
result of the restraint. 4 She incurred a $25 late fee and her
landlord threatened to evict her.221 Likewise, she was unable to
pay her telephone bill on time and thus had to pay an
additional deposit to restore her phone service.22 While her
account was restrained, Bank of America charged her an
unspecified amount of bounced check fees, 27 and Ms. Adomah
depended on the charity of relatives for necessities such as food
and transportation.'
215 Id. at 454-55.
216
217
218
219
220
221

Id. at 455.
Id.
id.
In re Adomah, 340 B.R. 453 at 455.
Id.
Id.

222 Id.
223 id.
224

Id.

225 In re Adomah, 340 B.R. at 455.
226

Id.

22' Id. at 460.
228

See id. at 455.
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Eighteen days after Ms. Adomah initiated the process of
freeing her account from restraint, Mitsubishi sent a letter to
Bank of America authorizing it to release her funds." Six days
after receipt of that letter, Bank of America released the
account.23 ° In the time between the Mitsubishi letter and the
account release, Ms. Adomah filed a motion for an order to
impose damages for violation of the automatic stay.23 '
In response to her motion, Bank of America contended
that: (1) Ms. Adomah did not have standing to bring the motion
because her bank account was property of the Chapter 7
bankruptcy estate, (2) even if Ms. Adomah had standing, the
court could not hold the bank liable for a violation of the stay
because the bank was a "passive garnishee" and was therefore
not authorized to release the restraint under New York State
law, and (3) Ms. Adomah's motion was moot because the bank
released funds prior to the filing of the motion. 2 With regard to
the first defense, the court found that although the accounts
were property of the bankruptcy estate, Ms. Adomah claimed
all of the money as exempt pursuant to section 522(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code' and New York Debtor and Creditor Law.'
The court suggested that the bank's standing argument was
disingenuous-the bank treated the money as belonging to Ms.
Adomah when it eventually released the funds without notice
to the Chapter 7 trustee."3' Therefore, the court found that Ms.
Adomah had standing to bring the motion.23 '
As to its second defense, the court rejected Bank of
America's claim pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution.23" In its decision, the court reasoned
that the federal Bankruptcy Code preempted state law, and
thus Bank of America had no legal obligation to abide by the
New York State requirements.23" In fact, Bank of America had
an obligation to void the restraining notice. Under Citizens
Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, Bank of America would not have

230
231

Id. at 456.
id.
In re Adomah, 340 B.R. at 456.

22 Id. at 454.
233 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2006).
234 See In re Adomah, 340 B.R. at 457; see also N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 283

(McKinney 2009).
23" In reAdomah, 340 B.R. at 457.
236 id.
237 Id. at 458; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2.
23s In re Adomah, 340 B.R. at 458.
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violated the automatic stay with a brief account restraint to
maintain the status quo. This, however, was not the case. 9
Instead, the bank maintained the restraint until Mitsubishi
provided its release.2 " The court noted that "Bank of America's
non-policy, which puts the onus entirely on the debtor and
permits a bank to freeze an account indefinitely and then do
4
nothing, violates any reading of Strumpf.""
Lastly, the court rejected the bank's third defense that
the motion became moot upon its release of the funds to Ms.
Adomah.242 The court applied section 362(k)" and noted that in
order for a violation to be "willful," a bank need not have
intended to violate the stay.2 4 Under the Bankruptcy Code,
mere knowledge of the stay will suffice.2 5 In her complaint, Ms.
Adomah sought "actual damages in the amount of $500,"
"punitive damages in an unspecified amount," and $2,500 in
attorney's fees.2 " The court found that Ms. Adomah did not
provide sufficient evidence that "she suffered $500 in losses"
because "it [wals unclear whether the $1,100 in her [accounts
would have been sufficient [in the first place] to pay" her rent
and telephone bills.2 7 While the court suggested that Ms.
Adomah could recover bounced check fees charged by Bank of
America, it did not award her those fees because the record did
not demonstrate whether the fees were charged validly prepetition or post-petition in violation of the stay.24 8 On the issue
of emotional distress damages, while the court acknowledged
that the Ninth Circuit has spoken of "an emerging consensus
recognizing the availability of damages for emotional distress
that results specifically from a willful violation of the
automatic stay,"24 the court found that Ms. Adomah failed to
29 Id.; see also Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 19-21 (1995)
(holding that a brief administrative hold on a bank account to protect the bank's setoff
rights did not violate the automatic stay).
240 In re Adomah, 340 B.R. at 458.
241

242

Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.

2'4 In the decision, the court referenced section 362(h), which was amended by

the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code to be a part of 362(k). See, e.g., In re
Weatherford, 413 B.R. 273, 282 n.5 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2009); see also In re Adomah, 340
B.R. at 460.
244
In re Adomah, 340 B.R. at 460.
245

See id.

246

Id.
Id.

247

248 Id.
2A9

Cir. 2004)).

Id.

(quoting Dawson v. Washington Mut. Bank, 390 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th
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make out a case of emotional distress.25 ° Moreover, "[s]ince
there [wals no indication that Bank of America acted
maliciously or in bad faith, the court [did] not award punitive
damages.". Instead, the court set a "hearing on the issue of
actual damages" and required Ms. Adomah's counsel to "file a
separate application for attorney's fees" with "appropriate time
records attached."5 '
In the Adomah case, the account restraint in violation of
the automatic stay operated in a similar manner to account
restraints in violation of EIPA. Like EIPA, the automatic stay
is automatic: neither statute requires notice to the bank, and
banks are bound by the statute regardless of their knowledge.
In Adomah, Bank of America was under the erroneous
impression that the automatic stay was not automatic. To the
contrary, the bank required approval of the judgment creditor's
attorney before lifting its restraint. Arguably, banks operate
under similar misconceptions regarding EIPA. Moreover, as in
cases of EIPA violations, Ms. Adomah suffered a negligible
amount of actual damages, but her dependence on the charity
of relatives for food and transportation suggests that she
suffered some form of emotional distress.
In re Adomah provides a promising illustration of how a
New York court might rule on a claim of an EIPA violation,
should the law be amended to include a remedy provision
similar to section 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code. Applying
Adomah in the context of an amended EIPA, a New York court
would likely award actual damages and attorney's fees for bank
noncompliance. Should EIPA be amended, it ideally should
provide for attorney's fees and the recovery of emotional
distress damages. The following sections explore how an EIPA
amendment providing for the recovery of attorney's fees is
attainable, but one providing for emotional distress damages is
not.
C.

The Importance of Fee Shifting

In order to be an effective consumer protection law,
EIPA should be amended to provide for damages in the event of
bank noncompliance, and such amendment must provide for
the award of attorneys fees. Generally, attorney's fees are not
... In re Adomah, 340 B.R. at 460.
251 Id. at 461.
252 Id.
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awarded without a statutory or contractual authorization."
While this general rule is designed to discourage litigation, in
circumstances where low-income individuals would have no
other way to access the courts, fee shifting allows them to be
heard.'
In many cases, attorneys have to turn away clients with
little expected return if the client lacks sufficient funds to pay
the attorney's fees.255 Indeed, "[elven nonprofit organizations
need the financing that comes from attorneys' fee awards."2 .
Importantly, fee shifting statutes give public interest and
private lawyers an incentive to represent low-income
litigants. 7 Furthermore, these statutes "place the burden of
financing access to justice squarely on those entities that have
actually violated the law"" and "give potential defendants an
additional incentive to comply with the law."259
In consumer credit litigation, the need for attorney's
fees is even greater."0 Often, the consumer attorney cannot
seek fees from plaintiffs because the nature of consumer cases
lends itself toward low-income litigants. Thus, the recovery of
fees generally requires submission of an attorney fee
application to the court. In turn, this requires a statutory
authorization for a fee award."2
To be sure, fee shifting may not be as effective in
practice as it is in theory. For example, in consumer credit
litigation, courts have "tended to make lower fee awards" in
cases handled by public interest legal services "than for counsel
from the private bar."62 Judges and policymakers alike tend to
2,3

See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 268-71 (1975).

See generally Evan L. Goldman, Fee Shifting, The Great Leveler, 187
25
N.J.L.J. 819 (Mar. 5, 2007).
255

Id.

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall,Meet Adam Smith: How Fee-Shifting
Statutes Providea Market-Based System for PromotingAccess to Justice (Though Some Judges
Don't Get It) 21 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 150, 2009), available at http'I/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1407275&download=yes (citation omitted).
27 Id. at 13-14.
25

255
260

Id. at 2.

Id. (citation omitted).
See Michael P. Malakoff & Louise Reiber Malakoff, Public Interest Practice

in Consumer Credit Law, in PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE AND FEE AWARDS 351, 397
(Herbert B. Newberg ed., 1980).
2" Id. Alternatively, if a statute does not authorize the award of fees, the
attorney may recover pursuant to a class action fund created by settlement or
litigation. Id.
262

Id. at 400.
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romanticize the job of the public interest lawyer, and presume
that such attorneys should not care whether they get paid.2"
Additionally, calculating the fee award can be complicated.2 '
New York courts require the attorney to submit evidence
showing the expenditure of time reasonably necessary to
litigate the case, 65 but limit recovery to fees actually incurred."
Accordingly, the New York attorney seeking fees must keep
careful track of time spent, including a breakdown of rates and
hours. This requirement hardly seems insurmountable.
Any fee shifting clause added to EIPA need not specify
the exact amount of fees to be awarded in the event of
successful litigation. New York courts read a requirement of
reasonableness into any fee shifting clause, regardless of its
terms."7
D.

Unlikely Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages

Although debtors may suffer more in emotional distress
than in pecuniary damages as a result of bank noncompliance
with EIPA, it is unlikely that any amendment to EIPA will
explicitly allow for a debtor to recover emotional distress
damages, nor is it likely to expect a New York court to award
emotional distress damages for such acts. Significantly, New
York courts are reluctant to allow a debtor to recover under the
tort of intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress for
damages resulting from creditors' abusive debt collection
methods, even if intentionally caused. Courts are wary of
potentially false or frivolous claims and the difficulty of
quantifying damages. ' For that reason, "liability has been
found only where the actor's conduct has been extreme and
outrageous, and that liability clearly does not extend to mere
Bagenstos, supranote 256, at 4.
Malakoff & Malakoff, supra note 260, at 398.
2
SO/Bluestar v. Canarsie Hotel Corp., 825 N.Y.S.2d 80, 82 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006) (finding that a mere affidavit is inadequate; the attorney must provide
breakdown of rates and hours).
266 Kamco Supply Corp. v. Annex Contr., Inc., 689 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999).
27 See, e.g., SO/Bluestar, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 82 (fee
shifting clause entitled
plaintiff to fees "to the extent that the amount is reasonable and warranted for the
services actually rendered").
Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Recovery by Debtor, Under Tort of Intentional or
Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress, for Damages Resulting from Debt Collection
Methods, 87 A.L.R. 3D 201 (1978).
269

Id.
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insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other trivialities." °
Under New York law, a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires allegations of: (1) extreme or
outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional
distress or reckless disregard of the probability of causing such
distress, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the
injury, and (4) severe emotional distress. 271 To assert a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the tortfeasor's
conduct "must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized
society."272 Importantly, mere procedural defects do not rise to
the level of conduct required.2 72 Accordingly, it is unreasonable
to expect that those harmed by bank noncompliance with EIPA
will recover for emotional damages, even though the damages
resulting from emotional distress may arguably encompass the
bulk of the victims' injuries. The unlikely prospect of amending
EIPA to provide for emotional distress damages should quell
any potential criticisms that this Note's proposed amendment
would be too harsh on the banks.
V.

CONCLUSION

New York's Exempt Income Protection Act is a vital
consumer law, paralleled in only three other states, and a great
step forward in ensuring that low-income individuals have
much-needed protection in the abusive debt collection
environment. The amounts banks are required to withhold
from judgment creditors under EIPA-either $1,740 or $2,500,
depending on the account holder's exemption status-are
relatively low. More importantly, the money belongs not to the
banks, but to their customers or, depending on the merits of
the collection lawsuit, to the creditor. However, despite EIPA's
270
271
272

Id.
In re Jacques, 416 B.R. 63, 82 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 83; see also Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303

(N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Callarama v. Assocs. Discount Corp., 329 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
273 See, e.g., In re Jacques, 416 B.R. at 83-84 (in bankruptcy case, creditor's
untimely filing of proof of claim was not sufficiently outrageous to support claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Webringer v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 457
N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (where a landlord continued to bill a tenant for
use of an office space after the tenant had vacated the premises, relief was denied
because the tenant did not require medical attention).
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provisions, banks have failed to comply with the law since its
inception in January 2009.
When consumer advocates and legislators designed
EIPA, they likely focused on addressing the ills of abusive debt
collection practices, not the banks' role in that process. In
hindsight, the legislature should have drafted the law to
recognize that banks play a crucial role in ensuring that their
customers retain funds protected by the law. Accordingly, EIPA
should be amended to include a remedy provision similar to
section 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus provide the
victim of bank noncompliance with a remedy to recover actual
damages and attorney's fees from the bank. Currently, existing
remedies under federal and state law for violations of EIPA are
insufficient, and model exempt income statutes fail to address
bank noncompliance. Accordingly, banks need to be pressed
with incentives to comply with the law.
While EIPA has apparent flaws, it serves the important
purpose of limiting judgment creditors' ability to restrain a
debtor's every last penny. Therefore, EIPA should be amended
to allow the law to function as intended.
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